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THE EMPTY CIRCLES OF LIBERAL
JUSTmCATION

Pierre Schlag*
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk
about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives
them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is
not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. ... In pass
ing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the
complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it
does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is im
mediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions
because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the
evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean some
thing by themselves.
- Roland Barthesl

American liberal thinkers are fascinated with the justification of
the liberal state. It is this question of justification that inspires and
organizes the work of such leading liberal thinkers as John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and Bruce Ackerman.2
The manifest import and prevalence of the question of justifica
tion among liberal thinkers makes it possible to speak here of a
certain "practice of liberal justification." This practice displays a
certain order and certain recursive characteristics. It is composed
of a common ontology and a common narrative. It poses for itself a
series of recursive intellectual problems answered with a stock set
of rhetorical moves, aimed at achieving certain key political
objectives.
Here I wish to explore the character and identity of this practice
of liberal justification. What sort of world does it offer us? And
how does it do its work?
The inquiry is thus twofold. In one aspect, the aim is to reveal
the practice of liberal justification - to reveal its organizing charac
ter, its pathways, and its problems. In another aspect, the effort
* Pierre Schlag, Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. B.A.1975, Yale; J.D. 1978, UCLA. - Ed.
1. ROLAND BARnras, MYTHOLOGIES 143 (Annette Lavers trans., Hill & Wang 1972)
(1957).
2. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE - FOUNDATIONS (1991); RONALD
DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); JoHN RAWLS, PounCAL LIBERALISM (1993); JoHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Fore
word: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986).
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here is to try to understand this practice - to appreciate why and
how it comes to have the distinctive identity and character it does.
·
Here, we will encounter a number of familiar leading liberal
thinkers and philosophers. We will not, however, encounter them
in the usual way. We will not attempt to join or to participate in the
practice of liberal justification. Hence, we will not pay much atten
tion to the intricate differences and disagreements that characterize
the various attempts at liberal justification. On the contrary, be
cause it is the practice of liberal justification as a whole that we seek
to reveal, this inquiry will focus on the broad - sometimes loose commonalities that sustain the intricate differences and disagree
ments, the broad-scale frames and orientations within which liberal
thinkers strive to set out and to resolve their problems.
Thus, the inquiry itself will deliberately fail to honor some of the
received categories and operations of Anglo-American analytical
philosophy. For one thing, the categories and operations of Anglo
American analytical philosophy are not helpful to the enterprise
pursued here. For another, those categories and operations are, as
a general matter, less an aid to explanation than they are in need of
explanation themselves.
.
We will also elide what are, for some �ther purposes, significant
differences in the objects and missions of the liberal versions of
political philosophy (Rawls), legal philosophy (H.L.A. Hart), con
stitutional theory (Ackerman and Michelman), theories of adjudi
cation (Dworkin), and theories of interpretation (Owen Fiss).
The point of this elision is most definitely not to suggest that
these various enterprises are all the same. Rather the elision here
enables a demonstration that the same aesthetic, the same ontologi
cal and narrative forms traverse these different liberal versions of
politics, legalism, constitutionalism, adjudication, and interpreta
tion. Here, as in other contexts, form not only anticipates sub
stance; but, in important ways, the form is the substance. 3

3. The practices of normative legal thought and Langdellianism institute, rehearse, and
entrench an aesthetic of self, social life, political engagement, and the like. See Pierre Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruc
tion, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1631 (1990) (hereinafter Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte'1; Pierre
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag,
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1627 {1991).

October 1997]

Liberal Justification

3

THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGY - ONTOLOGICAL
IDENTITIES AND NARRATIVES
In America, much of the practice of liberal justification is
shaped by, and organized around, the aspirations and problems of a
popular constitutional mythology. This conflation of liberalism
with constitutionalism is hardly surprising. For one thing, the
American constitutional mythology was itself very much influenced
by liberal thought as expounded by Montesquieu and Locke.4 For
another, contemporary American liberal thinkers are very much
oriented to the practical task of justifying and defending what they
see as an extant (and almost perfected) liberal state - namely,
their own.5

The popular narrative recounts the story of a sovereign people
who in a foundational moment established their own state by set
ting forth in a written constitution the powers and limitations of
their government. The very identity, content, and character of this
government is established by the Constitution itself. In tum, the
authority of this Constitution stems from the consent of the gov
erned - their acquiescence in a limited surrender of their sover
eign power in return for the benefits of a limited, representative
government.
This narrative ostensibly establishes the authority of the Consti
tution, justifies that authority through reason, and achieves both
tasks in a such a way as to demonstrate the consent of the governed
to constitutional rule. The achievement of these tasks effectively
requires a narrative that reconcij.es reason with authority, authority
with freedom, and freedom with reason. The attempts to achieve
such a reconciliation confront a series of recurrent liberal conun
drums that themselves give shape to the drama of liberal
justification.
This constitutional narrative, as expressed in both the popular
constitutional mythology and in the more intellectualized efforts at
liberal justification, revolves around certain key ontological

identities:
"The Constitution"
"The Founding"
4. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed.
& Thomas Nugent trans., University of Cal. Press 1977) (1748).
5. As but one instance among many, the very influential work of John Rawls conflates
questions about fundamental constitutional principles with the basic organization of the
state. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAUSM, supra note 2, at 227-28.
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"The People"
"The Consent of the People"
These key identities comprise a constitutional ontology: they are
the fundamental and enduring "beings" of the constitutional narra
tive and feature repeatedly in the drama of popular constitutional
mythology.
To be sure, the precise character of these identities can vary
somewhat. Indeed, it is precisely this genial flexibility that enables
these crucial identities to work as mythic referents. Yet, even as
their character and content may be "reconstructed," they endure as
the origins, boundaries, structures, and levers through which the
normative constructions of American liberal justification take place
- over and over again. American political-legal imagination is for
ever circling around and returning to these crucial ontological iden
tities. Consider then a brief description of these identities.

The Constitution is, in American popular and legal culture, an
authoritative paramount norm - hierarchically superior to any
other legal or political authority, save perhaps one (soon to be men
tioned). The Constitution is held to be the ultimate authority the frame of reference of last resort. All political and legal acts
must ultimately conform to this authoritative source. It is a mark of
the authoritative character of this source that it is invoked in all
manner of ways - as icon, symbol, plan, rule, argument, text, spirit
- to perform a variety of actions - constitute, organize, control,
regulate, inspire, justify. It is a measure of the paramount character
of this authoritative source that very often it is taken to be the final
word, the ultimate frame of reference, the last recourse, the very
limit of possible political-legal contestation.6

The foundational moment is an aspect of the politics of time. In
American popular culture, the founding in 1787 has special signifi
cance. While the point would seldom be expressed this way, the
foundational moment is a breach in time. It is an origin that signals
a discontinuity between all that has happened before and all that
will happen after that moment. With respect to what happened
before, the foundational moment acts as a rupture. Prior history,
prior practices, prior beliefs lose their intrinsic authority. Whatever
authority they retain after 1787- and in some cases it is considera
ble - stems from the fact that they are explicitly or tacitly incorpo
rated by the Constitution at the moment of foundation. Certain
6. Indeed, among lay people, arguments that the constitution requires thus and such are
often taken to be definitive invocations of the final authority.
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formulae and devices are explicitly used to refer back to the pre
Constitutional age. Hence, for instance, the liberty of the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is said to refer to the
liberties recognized historically by "the collective conscience of our
people. "7 This formula and others like it serve as a bridge between
the meaning of the Constitution and antecedent beliefs and tradi
tions. But even so, this renvoi confirms the originating and self
constituting character of the foundational moment.

The People also occupy a special place in the popular American
constitutional mythology. From the high school civics classroom to
the most intellectualized law school seminar, the People is held to
be sovereign. The Constitution - and thus the powers of govern
ment - is held to stem from the People. The People are a mythic
subject, a mythic agency. The precise identity of the People re
mains largely undetermined. In part that is because since 1787, we
have not heard a whole lot from "The People" - there has been no
widespread recognition of any action by the People.8 The popular
view that the Constitution at once stems from the People and yet is
the final, paramount authority creates the potential for a certain
undecidability in the hierarchy of the liberal state. Is it the Consti
tution that is paramount or the People?

Consent

is a fourth identity crucial to the liberal constitutional
narrative. The legitimacy of the paramount norm, of the Constitu
tion, depends upon the consent of the People. It is the historical or
mythic fact of consent to limited government that produces the le
gitimacy of the liberal state and its actions. Consent works both in
a positive and in a negative sense. In a positive sense, consent
means that there is a fundamental identification between the Peo
ple and the State such that the actions of the State become the ac
tions of the People. The question of political legitimacy is
seemingly resolved as the opposition between the People and the
State disappears. In a negative sense, consent functions to disable
the People from objecting to the actions of their government. The
government becomes an agent of the People, and so long as the
agent acts in accordance with the directions of the principal, there

7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In de
termining which rights are fundamental, judges . . . must look to the 'traditions and [collec
tive] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] . .. as to
be ranked as fundamental.' " (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
8. Any number of political actions - from the ratification of the Civil War Amendments,
to popular protests such as those during the Vietnam war, to the routine voting on state
referenda and initiatives - might well be considered actions of "The People.'' But the fact is
that they have not been considered actions of the People on any significant scale.
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are no grounds for complaint. Either way, positively or negatively,
consent operates to produce a mythic belief in self-rule.
CRUCIAL QUESTIONS
This deeply ingrained set of identities, and the constitutional
narrative they enable, exhibit a certain aesthetic- one that is repli
cated in more intellectualized efforts at liberal justification. Indeed,
one can consider the intellectualized efforts at liberal justification as
attempts to rework the popular constitutional mythology in ways
that strive to avoid some of its intellectual shortcomings. These
shortcomings are in part linked to the exigent demand for a justifi
cation of the liberal state as a form of self-government.
The representation of the liberal state as a form of self-rule
means that the liberal state must somehow be accepted, ratified, or
consented to by those who are ruled. This logic of self-rule and
self-government is exceedingly demanding. Accordingly, as a form
of justification, popular constitutional mythology confronts a
number of familiar problems. Why, for instance, should a constitu
tion adopted more than two centuries ago in the pre-industrial age
bind generations living in postindustrial conditions? Why should
subsequent generations honor the actions and political determina
tions of the generation of 1787? And in what way does past consent
to constitutional government suffice to establish consent in the
present?
These questions are closely related. Perhaps they are even dif
ferent ways of asking the same question. If so, the question is
somewhat nebulous: it is not always clear what the problem is. In
one sense, one might say that the problem is one of authority. What
is it that endows a peculiar generation - the generation of 1787 with the authority to prescribe the limits and channels of political
possibility for subsequent others? But one could also frame the
problem as one of reason. What reason is there to follow the
proclivities, fears, and hopes of a pre-industrial generation in the
context of a technological postindustrial society? Why is this con
stant reference to an unruly and scatter-shot array of documents
from the past a reasoned way of fashioning the politics and the law
of the present? So too, the problem might be framed as one of
freedom. What precisely allows some to delimit the freedom of
others when these others have not been consulted? In what sense is
their freedom honored and observed?
To frame these questions in the idioms of authority, reason, and
freedom seems quite natural. That is because liberalism itself de-
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mands observance of these three requirements. Indeed, it is the
hallmark of liberalism to seek reconciliation of authority, reason,
and freedom in terms that are consonant with each.9
The popular mythology promises to reconcile these three re
quirements by reference to the idea of self-government. The popu
lar mythology, of course, only works to the extent that individuals
understand themselves within the terms set forth in the myth. Once
intellectual, social, or political doubt discredits the myth, it becomes
the task of liberal justification to refashion the crucial ontological
identities and their relations in a refurbished narrative. Liberal jus
tification devotes itself to reconstructing the myth so that it
achieves credibility once more, even to the more discerning and
critical of subjects - namely, the political losers and the skeptical
intelligentsia.
Liberal justification thus attempts to produce an identification
between the rulers and the ruled. But this cannot be just any identi
fication. It must be a liberal identification - an identification that
itself comports with liberal precepts - one that can be achieved
through liberal

reason,

while respecting the freedom of the liberal

individual subject, and yet emerging at the end as nonetheless

authoritative.
LIBERAL CONUNDRUMS
Achieving a liberal identification between the rulers and the
ruled is surely no easy task. There are many ways in which even the
best liberal efforts can go wrong.
Why, for instance, should a reasoning subject consider the Con
stitution to be authoritative? To ask this question is to ask for the
justification of authority. Already this produces a quandary. For
one thing, to ask for a justification in support of an authority can
already displace the authoritative status of the authority.

As

:Kierkegaard observed:
To ask if Christ is profound is a blasphemy and an attempt to destroy
him with ruse (either with consciousness or unconsciously) since the
question contains doubt concerning his authority.... To ask if a king
is a genius - for him to be obeyed in the case of a positive answer is actually a lese-majeste since the question contains the doubt in the
sense of submission to his authority.10

9. See generally
MOLOGY

AND

GERAID F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LmERALISM: AN EssAY ON EPISTE
POUI1CAL THEORY (1996).

10. Soren Kierkegaard, "The Notion of the Chosen One," quoted in SLAVOJ ZIZEK, Fa�
THEY KNow NoT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A P0Lr11CAL FACTOR 236 (1991).
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The request for a justification to support an authority is already a
demotion of the authority in question; it is already an acknowledge
ment that the authority is in need of further support. It is an ac
knowledgement that an authority is authoritative only so long as it
is consonant with a higher order justification.
To ask for a justification of authority thus already bespeaks a
loss of authority. In certain political regimes of a theocratic or au
tocratic character, the justification of authority is a question that
need not arise. In theocratic political thought, God is His own
raison d'etre and is not in need of any further justification. In lib
eral thought, however, the conundrum of reason and authority must
be confronted. For it is an aspect of liberalism itself that it cannot
abide dogma, but must show that its authority is justified.
To simply assert that the Constitution is authoritative and in
need of no justification will not do.11 On the contrary, the Constitu
tion must always be justified as an authority that can be made to
answer in the court of reason. This, of course, is an extremely diffi
cult task. Indeed, the rhetoric of reason and the rhetoric of author
ity are hardly congruent. Reason demands argument and
justification. Authority demands submission and obeisance. The
irony is that there is an inverse relation between the reasoned char
acter of justification and the authoritative character of authority.
The more one insists on a justification of authority, the less authori
tative authority will be. Whatever power authority has will stem
not from its authoritative status, but rather from the strength of the
justification that supports it. Correspondingly, the more one insists
on the authoritative character of a justification, the less reasoned it
will be. This is a point to which we shall return.
In liberal thought, it is not just authority and reason that must
be reconciled, but each of them must in tum be reconciled with
freedom. The Constitution must be the product of reason and it
must be authoritative. But, according to the popular mythology, it
must also be the kind of reasoned authority to which the governed
freely consent.
Authority and freedom may perhaps be compatible, but not ob
viously so. A political authority that one freely chooses, to which
one freely submits, is, of course, not much of a political authority.
It lacks certain crucial aspects of political authority - including the
power to command from out of its own identity the submission of
11. Sometimes, however, it is asserted that the question of justification is a matter of
philosophy not law. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.

R.E.v.

353, 383-84 (1981).

October 1997]

Liberal Justification

9

those subject to authority. An authority that can be freely accepted

or rejected does not have much in the way of authoritative force. In
a word, it is hardly compelling. Correspondingly, the more power

an authority has to command the submission of its subjects, the less
they will be free in choosing to submit to this authority.
Reason and freedom are also in tension. Reason - at least

within the liberal vision - has its own requirements and its own
procedures that demand observance regardless of whether a subject
accepts reason in substance. Reason demands that the addressee
become a certain kind of person - a reasonable one - that ac

cedes to all reasoned arguments. Reason, for good or ill, demands
at the outset that one take a certain attitude and orientation to

wards deliberation and decisionmaking. This point is familiar to all
who have seen parents reasoning with their child or philosophy

professors reasoning with their students. The first demand is always

that the addressee become a subject who listens and reasons. One
need not be an aficionado of Nietzsche or Foucault to recognize

that in this demand there may be a restriction of freedom, a reduc
tion of the possibilities of the subject. To be sure, one can answer in
a Kantian vein that only the subject capable of reasoning is truly
capable of freedom.

But this answer begs the question, for it

presumes that in reason's demand that the individual subject submit
to reason there is no freedom lost. Whether there is - as a Nietz
sche or a Foucault might claim - or there is not - as a Kant would

maintain - is precisely the question.

These are rather exigent demands. Reason, authority, and free

dom must be reconciled with each other so as to induce the con

sumers of the liberal myth to embrace the proffered justification as

an articulation of their own beliefs. The drive in each case is to
persuade the consumers of the liberal myth that, informed by rea
son, they freely choose an authoritative, constitutional liberal state.

One way of achieving this objective is simply to relax liberalism

- to soften the intellectual medium or the intellectual milieu
within which the work of liberal justification is performed. Another
way is to rework the fundamental ontologies and narratives. Lib

eral thinkers, as a group, do both.

RELAXING LIBERALISM
One of the ways in which liberal thinkers facilitate their task of

justification lies in the use of accommodating metaphors to describe

and enable their reconciliation of reason, authority, and freedom.

Hence, for example, the popularity among liberal intellectuals of
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such fashionable terms as "reconstructing," "reconstituting," "re
thinking," or "re-"virtually anything.
The "re" allows liberal thinkers the latitude to represent the
productions of liberal justification as at once the same and yet dif
ferent from the original. The liberal production is the same in that
the authority, the institutions, and the practices of the "original"
popular mythology remain intact. The liberal production is differ
ent in that the intellectual embarrassments of the original popular
mythology are repaired, excised, exorcised, or redeemed by the
"higher order" liberal justification. It is the genial ambiguity of
terms like "reconstruction" that at once obscures and enables the
coexistence of sameness and difference. Another contemporary
metaphor - equally accommodating - is the trope of "transla
tion. "12 Translation implies the bringing of an original into a new
context such that the original is at once the same - as original as
the original can be given the new context - and yet different - no
longer as original as the original. Ultimately, these generous meta
phors authorize liberal intellectuals to establish a parallel universe.
A PARALLEL UNIVERSE

In terms of resolving the conundrums posed by the conjunction
of reason, authority, and freedom, the rhetorical strategy of liberal
justification is almost always the same. As we shall see, the tensions
between the three terms - reason, authority, and freedom - dissi
pate as the identities of the three terms are refashioned such that
they are consonant and harmonious.
Thus, thinkers like Rawls, Ackerman, Michelman, and other
leading American liberal thinkers attempt to refashion the constitu
tional mythology so as to avoid its inadequacies, but to do so in a
way that nonetheless continues to resonate with the popular consti
tutional ontology and the popular constitutional narrative. Those
who are engaged in the enterprise of liberal justification seek an
understanding that will be different enough to be intellectually re
spectable but sufficiently the same so as to reinforce - rather than
supplant - the popular constitutional mythology.
Here the hermeneutically generous metaphors, such as recon
struction, reconstitution, translation, and so on, serve to enable lib
eral thinkers to abstract, dehistoricize, decontextualize, and
detemporalize the popular constitutional mythology. This abstrac12. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1368-76
(1997); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 {1993).

October 1997]

Liberal Justification

11

tion, dehistoricization, decontextualization, and detemporalization
is visited upon any or all of the key ontological identities:
The Constitution
The Founding
The People
Their Consent
Liberal justification thus attempts to refurbish the popular constitu
tional mythology by rendering the key ontological identities and
narratives more capacious and appealing than the historical
originals.
REMODELING THE CONSTITUTION

In place of the Constitution, liberal justification substitutes a
more malleable and more capacious paramount norm. The para
mount norm is an abstracted and decontextualized version of the
Constitution itself. In Rawls, for instance, the paramount norm
takes the form of two highly abstract principles of justice: an injunc
tion to (1) maximize the total system of liberty, and (2) arrange
inequalities in wealth and other such "primary goods" so that the
arrangement redounds to the advantage of the least well off.13 In
Ackerman's work, the paramount norm is cast as instances of
"higher lawmaking."14 In Dworkin's work, the paramount norm
consists of the best theory that best fits the institutional materials.15
In Hart, following perhaps a more English than American model,
the paramount norm is a hypothetical and unspecified master rule
of recognition.16
The capacious and indeterminate identity of the paramount
norm is a response to certain rhetorical pressures. Inasmuch as the
13. The Rawlsian theory of justice is famous for the articulation of two fundamental prin
ciples of justice that the state must satisfy in order to be just. Roughly stated, the first princi
ple requires a maximization of the total system of liberties. The second principle requires
that inequalities in wealth, income, and other such primary goods should be distributed so as
to redound to the least well advantaged. See generally RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 2.
14. The hallmark of Bruce Ackerman's recent work is a distinction between normal and
higher lawmaking. Normal lawmaking occurs when competing interest groups jostle with
each other in attempting to further their different agendas. There is no great consensus on
future change. Higher lawmaking, by contrast, occurs when a significant part of the citizenry
is able to mobilize itself and others for a significant change in the political character of the
nation. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 270-72.
15. See DwoRKIN supra note 2, at 255, 405-06. Ronald Dworkin's work is characterized
by an attempt to fuse moral philosophy with the authoritative materials of law. Both are
anchored and reflected in the other and each is reconciled with the other according to various
aesthetic criteria such as "coherence" and "fit." See generally DwoRKIN, supra note 2.
16. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAw 92 (2d ed. 1994).
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paramount norm must, one way or another, be chosen or accepted
by its subjects, there is great rhetorical pressure to make this para
mount norm as inclusive as possible. There is, in short, a tremen
dous pressure to produce an exceedingly abstract, capacious, and
perhaps even mystical norm - the kind of norm that will allow
each of us to read into it whatever we wish to find there. The more
abstract, mystical, or capacious the paramount norm, the less it will
exhibit concrete features that might trigger the objection of any
particular reader. Thus, Dworkin's paramount norm of integrity,
making the law the best it can be,17 is immensely capacious - capa
ble of harboring virtually any jurisprudence. Rawls's two principles
of justice are notoriously fiexible.18 As for Hart's ultimate rule of
recognition, it verges on the mystical. It is not at all clear what it is,
what content it may have, or how it may be identified.19

RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUNDATIONS
In liberal justification the paramount norm, typically, is tempo
rarily liberated from any historically situated event. In Rawls, this
is accomplished by bringing the universalizing, abstracting, ahistori
cal frame of Anglo-American moral philosophy into play. In a real
sense, the foundational moment in Rawls, "the original position," is
supposed to be a (virtually) timeless thought experiment - or, as
he calls it, a "device of representation."20 This founding moment,
in turn, is achieved as the reader is invited and induced to abstract
from his or her historical, sociological, and psychological circum
stances. This emancipation of the paramount norm from any his
torically or temporally situated event serves to avoid the
arbitrariness of localizing the founding movement of a particular
point in historical time. Instead, the paramount norm assumes a
universal appearance, transcending the confines of historical
epochs, or the parochial self-interests of any specific generation.
Bruce Ackerman's work presents an especially interesting twist
on this emancipation of the paramount norm from history.21
Through his articulation of the notion of "transformative politics,"
17. See D w oRKIN, supra note 2, at 411.
18. Inasmuch as the Rawlsian scheme does not - and indeed does not set out to -

resolve empirical questions about the relative performance of various economic systems or
social arrangements, the Rawlsian principles leave a great deal of room for argument over
which kind of system or arrangement is best: socialism, welfare capitalism, economic liberta
rianism, and so on.
19. See HART, supra note 16, at 106.
20. RAWLS, PounCAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 25-27.
21. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2.
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Ackerman maintains the possibility that each generation can con
tribute to the establishment of a paramount norm through an effort
at "higher lawmaking," that meets certain requirements of constitu

tion making.22 In a sense, like the Rawlsian strategy, this approach
overcomes the arbitrariness of privileging a particular generation
and a particular epoch in establishing the paramount norm. But, in
another sense, because of its exigent requirements - quite reminis
cent of the Constitution's Article V amendment procedures - this
dispersal of the founding moment nonetheless remains tied to the
parochial interests of some particular generations and some particu
lar epochs. Ackerman's peculiar contribution is to spread (and pos
sibly diffuse) the arbitrariness by dispersing it across multiple
generations.

REFASHIONING THE MYTHIC SUBJECT
The practice of liberal justification also attempts to rework the
subject who consents to the paramount norm. Recall that the para
mount norm in liberal justification is not self-validating. The para
mount norm has to be accepted or ratified by its subjects. These
subjects are hardly a monolithic crew. Their dispositions, orienta
tions, identities, interests, and preferences are far from homogene
ous. The likelihood that any paramount norm would be satisfactory
to all of them is extremely small. Moreover, they are not always
receptive to reasoned argument. If these subjects are to accept a
paramount norm, they will have to be disciplined. Their identities
will have to be recast in such a way as to make them more manage
able, more docile, and more compliant.
And so they are. At the level of the individual the subject is
recast as coherent, unified, autonomous, self-directing - in short,
as abstracted individual subjects. In turn, these subjects are sum
moned, invited, and induced to identify with grand supra-individual
subjects: "We the People" (Ackerman), "The Interpretive Commu
nity" (Fiss), "Persons in the Original Position" (Rawls), or "Hercu
les" (Dworkin).23 Assuming these new identities, the liberal
subjects become capable of accepting the paramount norm.
One problem with this mythical fashioning of supra-individual
subject identities is that in order for the logic of consent to work,
the individual liberal subjects must in fact identify with the mythic
22. See id. at 266-94.
23. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7; DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 238-40; RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, at 11; Owen FISS, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.
L. REv.

739, 745 (1982).
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supra-individual subject identities. If the individual liberal subjects
do not identify with these mythic identities, then, of course,
whatever these mythic identities accept, ratify, or consent to will
remain beside the point. Liberal thinkers use a variety of rhetorical
techniques to prompt identification with the mythic self-representa
tion. Most of these techniques involve the use of moral :flattery, the
promise of communal belonging, the incentive of self-interest, and a
certain amount of rhetorical bullying.
Among the liberal thinkers, Rawls is particularly interesting be
cause he is the most explicit and self-reflective in his construction of
a mythic process that will yield consent to a paramount norm.
Hence, Rawls constructs as a thought experiment an "original posi
tion" in which artificial persons are to choose behind "a veil of ig
norance" the principles that are to regulate "the basic structure" of
society.24 Rawls makes a point of telling his readers that "the origi
nal position" is a representational device designed specifically to
yield a choice for his paramount norm - what he calls "justice as
fairness. "25
Readers are invited to identify with the person in the original
position through moral :flattery and an appeal to self-interest. The
person in the original position is, in his abstraction, universality and
openness - a moralistic self-image to which readers will feel they
ought to aspire. At the same time, the person in the original posi
tion is asked to evaluate various forms of political organization that
will advance his self-interest. The person in the original position is
thus a hybrid - conjoined in the observance of morality and the
pursuit of self-interest.
What makes the Rawlsian argument remarkable is precisely this
conjunction of moral attitude and instrumental self-interest as sup
portive of a choice for his paramount norm. The problem with the
Rawlsian strategy, as we shall see, is that the person in the original
position ultimately fails to adequately represent the moral concern
and the instrumental self-interest of the reader.
If Rawls is the most interesting in his refashioning of the subject,
Dworkin is no doubt the most extravagant. If Rawls's subject is
stripped of flourish and ready for normative submission, Dworkin's
mythic subject is dressed to kill. Dworkin invites his readers to be
come "Hercules" - a formidable legal giant gifted with profound
moral insight and unbounded legal intelligence. Dworkin's scheme
24. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, § 3.
25. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 28.
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is clearly one of flattery. It is an elaborate self-aggrandizement fan
tasy that allows each of his readers to become an exalted and gran
diose self. The problem with this account is that the mythic self
representation known as Hercules seems to be as much a candidate
for psychoanalytic intervention as an agency for a legitimate law.
Indeed, Hercules, while truly grand, turns out to be a fairly vacuous
fellow ruling over a jurisprudential empire that is very nearly a per
fect mirror image of his own truly grand though nearly vacuous
self.26
Ackerman's work is interesting in that, more than other liberal
thinkers, he attempts to rework and refashion the mythic subject of
"The People" in a way that can claim some fidelity to the popular
constitutional mythology.27 Of the key ontological identities in the
popular constitutional mythology, it is perhaps "The People" that
has remained the most abstract and the most elusive. For one thing,
it has been a long time since "The People" have been seen to act.28
Th.ere is no obvious concrete referent for "The People." When do
the People act? In constitutional conventions? In popular initia
tives? In massive street protests?29
Nor has the category of "The People" been used much in recent
American history to describe political or legal events: It remains a
largely empty abstraction. Few (if any) political or legal actions are
attributed to the People. The point becomes manifest if one com
pares the status of the People to the status of The Constitution. In
contrast with the People, the Constitution is a key ontological iden
tity that is almost daily infused with meaning and significance. It is
incessantly invoked, evoked, celebrated, berated, and abused. The
Constitution is a daily site for contestation, conflict, and thus social
and political definition. The Constitution is on CNN; the People
are not.
Moreover, American culture makes it difficult, both intellectu
ally and politically, to sustain supra-individual subjects such as the
People.3o For one thing, if such supra-individual subjects are ac
corded sufficient depth and significance, they could displace or dis
turb the centerpiece of American liberalism - namely, the liberal
individual subject. Accordingly, to the extent that supra-individual

26. See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 3, at 1662-67.
27. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7.
28. See id. at 6.
29. For Ackerman's attempt to work out some of these difficulties, see id. at 272-90.
30. For one interesting effort to elaborate such a constitutional subject, see Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119 (1995).
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subjects are allowed on the intellectual or political scene, they are
weak, ephemeral, schematic. As if in confirmation of the point, the
obvious supra-individual subject in American life - namely, the
"community" - is most often cast as a derivative construction, the
aggregation of individuals and individual action.31 Indeed, in the
rhetoric of American politics, an appeal to "community" is almost
always a sure loser - destined to be trumped by appeals to individ
ual liberty and individual freedom. In short, the Hegelian-Marxist
tradition that places great importance on collective or supra-indi
vidual subjects such as "nation" or "class" remains largely foreign
and antithetical to American intellectual and political life, as do fas
cistic subjects steeped in notions of "the soil," "the nation," and
"the blood."32
Ackerman's recent works nonetheless attempt to introduce a di
luted Hegelianism into the American constitutional mythology by
introducing - or from his perspective, reviving - the mythic sub
ject "The People." Ackerman's argument strives to prompt a rec
ognition of the crucial role played by the People in American
constitutional history. According to Ackerman, it is this mythic
agency of the People that periodically engages in "higher lawmak
ing" and thereby yields the paramount norm that is supposed to
regulate constitutional meaning. Ackerman's argument thus can be
charitably understood as a kind of sustained reflection on American
constitutional history, one that allows readers to reach for a self
conscious recognition of what they already are - namely, potential
instantiations of "We the People." As Ackerman himself says,
"[W]e too may find it within ourselves to speak with the voice of
We the People - so long as we keep the language alive."33 His
enterprise, as he describes it, is not "to glimpse the shape of Uto
pia," but to "capture the spirit of the existing historical enterprise
- to persuade you that this spirit is better captured by the dualist
emphasis on rule by the People than any competing theory of
American government. "34 Why should Americans accept this
mythic self-representation? The answers are classic. First, because

31. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmCS 76-81, 128, 211
(1975).
32. Even American racism seems organized more around schemes of exclusion, denigra
tion, and hatred rather than on the celebration or worship of "blood" or "the nation." For
further exploration, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRmCAL WHITE STUDIES:
LooKING BEHIND THE MmRoR (1997).
33. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 302.
34. Id. at 321.
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Americans already do.3s Second, because it is morally appealing.36
And third, because it is in their interest.37
REPRODUCING CONSENT
Yet another point at which the liberal justification is subject to
rhetorical pressure is in the conceptualization of what it means to
accept, ratify, or consent to the paramount norm. Insofar as an ap
peal to an actual historical act of acceptance, ratification, or consent
by all individual subjects is beyond possibility, the crucial rhetorical
action of acceptance, ratification, or consent must be redefined and
refashioned. The problem then becomes to articulate defensible
criteria for what counts as acceptance, ratification, or consent by
the mythic subject.
For Rawls, the requisite consent is generated by the pre-given
interests of the person in the original position. For Ackerman, the
problem of consent is trans-substantiated into what counts as a le
gitimate act of higher lawmaking by his mythic subject, "We the
People." As Ackerman puts it:
What fundamental criteria should be used to judge a movement's
claim to speak for "the People"? How should a higher lawmaking
system be designed that can reliably distinguish between the rare oc
casions upon which a mobilized majority of American citizens ham
mer out a considered judgment on a fundamental matter of principle,
and the countless decisions of normal politics?38

For Owen Fiss, the problem of specifying what would count as ac
ceptance, ratification, or consent never seems to arise at all.39 It is
outside the realm of his inquiry and is simply presumed. The entire
question of how the interpretive community comes to recognize
its legitimate "disciplining rules" is not a question for Fiss; it just
does - end of story. For Fiss, the relation of the mythic self
representation to the paramount norm - specifically, the interpre
tive community to the disciplining rules - is one of reciprocal con
stitution.40 No more, no less. Thus, one can see a certain common

35. See, e.g., id. at 5.
36. See, e.g., id. at 316. Note that while Ackerman insists repeatedly that his is not a
utopian project, nonetheless, participation in his vision is rewarded by the promise of a gran
diose and morally self-flattering role.
37. As Ackerman puts it, "Are you quite sure that it is in your self-interest to scoff at the
very idea of citizenship, when you may later want to protect your own hide by appealing to
others to take a broad view of the public good?" Id. at 313.
38. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 55.
39. See Fiss, supra note 23.
40.

See id.
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aesthetic that shapes, more or less loosely, the work of liberal
thinkers:
Popular

Constitutional
Mythology
Political Philosophy

The
Constitution

The Founding

Principles of

Original

(John Rawls41)

Justice (for the
basic structure)

Legal Philosophy

The Master

(H.LA. Hart42)
Constitutional
Philosophy

(Bruce Ackerman43)

Position

Higher

Persons taking

Acceptance as

Transformative "We, the People"
Moments

(17fr7, 1865,
1935, etc.)

Dialogue and
reason-giving

Hercules, the
interpretive
attitude of the

Integrity
and fit

The Interpretive

Binding

The

Rules

Popular

Acceptance,
with adequate
breadth, depth,

The Court as
modeled on the
principle of
dialogic selfgovernment

Disciplining

binding

and
decisiveness

authoritative
(Ronald Dworkin45) materials made
the best they
can be
Theory of

Consent

perspective

(Frank
Michelman44)

Interpretation
(Owen Fiss46)

Persons in the

the internal

Constitutional
Theory

Theory of
Adjudication

Ratification

Original Position

Rule of
Recognition
Lawmaking

The Framers

internal
perspective

Community

The work of liberal justification is accomplished through the refash
ioning of mythic identities and the relations of the four critical
terms - the paramount norm, the founding moment, the subject,
and its consent - in ways that make the myth seem intellectually
more convincing.
Of course, not all liberal thinkers rework all of the fundamental
ontological identities. Some thinkers strive to perform the recon
struction by locating the crucial problems and the reconstructive

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2.
See Hart, supra note 16.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 2.
See Michelman, supra note 2.

Ronald Dworkin is not a contractarian philosopher. Nonetheless, his fundamental
ontology remains consonant with the contractarian narrative. See DWORKIN, supra note 2.

46. See Fiss, supra

note 23.
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work in a few of the fundamental ontological identities. What is
crucial is that the reworking of some fundamental ontological iden
tities effectively reconstructs the popular constitutional mythology
in a way that produces a more convin�.iD.g narrative reconciliation of
authority, reason, and freedom.
THE ROLE OF MYTH

IN

LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION

In one sense, it is striking just how large a role myth seems to
play in liberal justification. Indeed, the reliance of liberal justifica
tion on mythic devices of presentation and argument seems discor
dant with its self-advertisements as a carefully reasoned enterprise.
In another sense, of course, there is nothing odd about the use
of myth in liberal justification. To the extent that liberal law and
politics are socially constructed - as opposed to, say, divinely pro
duced, intellectually derived, or a metaphysically given - myth is
an extremely effective vehicle for the creation and sedimentation of
liberal belief and liberal practice. Myth serves as a rhetorical device
for entrenching shared understandings of the political and legal

world. In this sense, myth operates not simply as a rhetorical lure
that captivates its audience, but also as one that effectively estab
lishes and entrenches the identities, relations, and levers that com
prise the liberal legal and political world. To put it simply: The
social existence of a shared legal and political world is, in part, a
creation of myth. To put it perhaps too strongly: If we are going to
have a legal and political world at all - liberal or not - it will be,
at least in part, a construction of myth. In a sense, then, it would be
bizarre, even perverse, to begrudge a legal and political system sim
ply for its use of myth.

What is neither perverse nor bizarre is to examine particular
legal and political myths. It is at this level that the mythic aspect of
liberal justification becomes interesting. It becomes interesting pre
cisely because the practice of liberal justification continuously seeks
to ground liberalism in an authoritative, reasoned, free choice. The
use of myth may be compatible with authority, but it is in uneasy
tension with reason and free choice. Indeed, if the myth of reason
and free choice is to do its work, then it must deny the mythic char
acter of reason and free choice. This is precisely the role that lib
eral justification attempts to play: it is the kind of mythic
construction that depends upon the continuous denial of its own
mythic character. Liberalism is the myth that dares not speak its
name. It is, in short, the kind of intellectual enterprise that must
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continuously deny both what it is and what it does.47 Consider,
then, the mythic aspects of the four fundamental ontological
identities.
The various versions of the paramount norm listed are all cast in
the language of myth:
The Principles of Justice
The Ultimate Rule of Recognition
Higher Lawmaking
The Authoritative Materials
The Disciplining Rules
These are imaginary constructions endowed with considerable mag
ical powers. Indeed, consider that these mythic creations might
function well in a Star Wars movie: "May the Authoritative Materi
als be with you," or "May you always follow the Master Rule of
Recognition."
Of course, there is something facile, even tendentious, in such
juxtapositions. But there is also a serious point. The narrative
structure of Star Wars, however impoverished it may be, works pre
cisely because it mimics in a new vocabulary certain basic myths of
Western culture: the originary power of the force, the hero who
becomes at one with the force, the fallen one who rebels against the
force, the archetypal struggle of good and evil, and so on. The same
is true of the paramount norms: they draw their persuasive power
by mimicking, in a new, elusive vocabulary, certain embedded
myths of western civilization: the origin, the power of the word, the
ultimate authority.
The elusiveness of these paramount norms contributes greatly
to their mythic character. For one thing, the norms are hard to pin
down and can thus more easily be cast as all-inclusive or ultimate.
Moreover, their elusiveness serves to elide the question of their
provenance. To be sure, these paramount norms are binding, regu
lative, or authoritative because they are accepted by a mythic sub
ject. But that still leaves open the questions: Where do these
mythic paramount norms come from? Just how do they come to be
included on the menu? Or more accurately: How do they become
the menu?
The various paramount norms are in turn accepted by a mythic
a constructed, artificial, schematic subject endowed with
mythic powers of creation and authority:

subject

-

Persons in the Original Position
47. See Stanley F'tsh, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DuKE LJ. 997.
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Persons taking the internal perspective
We the People
The Court
Hercules
The Interpretive Community
Here too the agencies are endowed with elusive and mysterious
qualities. Some of these are endowed with an oracular function:
"The Court" as described by Frank Michelman serves as an agency
that models dialogic self-govemment.48
The Court becomes the oracle that mediates between the spirit
of a republican ideal of government and the masses who must ac
cept its rule. In more pedestrian versions, The Court is the oracle
authorized to receive and communicate the meanings of the Consti
tution for the masses. Other agencies, such as "We the People,"
"Persons in the original position," "The interpretive community,''
or tellingly, "Hercules," are not so much oracular as endowed with
the power to create originary meaning. As befits such agents and
their Herculean tasks, the methods of creation remain shrouded in
mystery.
In tum, consent to the paramount norms itself has mythic pro
portions. The acceptance is a constructed symbolic event that oc
curs in highly specified circumstance. Thus in Rawls's work,
acceptance occurs through the hypothetical and nonhistorical "de
vice of representation" known as the "original position."49 The ac
ceptance is deliberately induced through a rhetorical construction
of the choice and the situation that will prompt such an acceptance.
In Ackerman's work, acceptance occurs through "transformative
moments": descriptions of the breadth, depth, and decisiveness of
popular mobilization required for instances of higher lawmaking.so
In tum, the acceptance is accorded a transcendent character - one
that is supposed to cut through time, history, and context to govern
sundry unanticipated situations.
It is a measure of the power of such mythic versions of accept
ance that few respond by saying "So what?" Indeed, amidst all the
I am indebted to Rebecca French for this insight.
49. Rawls acknowledges - indeed insists - that "the original position is to be seen as a
device of representation and hence any agreement reached by the parties must be regarded
as both hypothetical and nonhistorical." RAwr.s, POLITICAL LmERALISM, supra note 2, at 24.
50. As for Ackerman, he seems to treat his own instances of "higher lawmaking" - his
"transformative moments" - as significant only to the extent that they are historically real.
Thus he worries at great {and rhetorically counterproductive) length about what might con
stitute sufficient political mobilization to count as "higher lawmaking." See ACKERMAN,
supra note 2, at 272-80.
48.
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attacks on Ackerman's work, few bother to argue: "So what if 'the
People' engage in higher lawmaking?" "Why should this matter to
us?" And again, few attack Ackerman's work by asking, "What do
you mean higher lawmaking?" "In what sense is it higher, as op
posed to, say, exalted? transported? visionary? delusional? nuts?"
The very fact that these questions often do not arise - even for the
most stalwart critics - bespeaks the mythic power accorded to the
notions of acceptance and consent in liberal justification.
In temporal terms, the acceptance functions as an origin, cutting
off the authority of anterior claims and traversing across future time
to regulate contexts and circumstances that have not yet arisen.
The acceptance totalizes political and legal time, subordinating this
time to the power of a determinate action - acceptance at the
founding moment.
In turn, the founding moment is itself cast in mythic language:
The Founding
The Original Position
The Transformative Moments
The founding moment serves to locate the point in time at which
the mythic subject consents to the paramount norm. In a sense, the
foundational moment serves as the vehicle to identify the conver
gence of the other three fundamental ontological identities: a para
mount norm that is accepted by the mythical subject.
The moment of founding, in its singularity and in its distinctive
ness, is what accords authority and legitimacy to the entire scheme.
It is the moment of foundation - and its attendant specification that enables a sense of one paramount norm that, however abstract,
is nonetheless singular and unitary.51 The founding moment serves
as the aesthetic vehicle for the specification of the singular authori
tative moment for the constitution of the liberal state. It endows the
particular creation of the paramount norm with political-legal privi
lege extending indefinitely into the future, transcending context and
circumstance.
Even for Ackerman, who insists on pluralizing the foundational
moment into several - so far three and a half52 - that extend in
definitely into the future, such moments are nonetheless singular in

51. Even Ackerman's dualist democracy - his distinction between normal and higher
lawmaking - is ensconced in the security of an overarching monism. This is the monism of
Ackerman's own perspective: his singular and at times rather detailed elaboration of dualist
democracy. In short, Ackerman is in favor of dualist democracy within his own monistic
understanding of its content and its significance.
52. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, ls
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799, 802-03 (1995).
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character. To be sure, Ackerman would protest that his particular
account is designed precisely to avoid such monistic tendencies.53
In one sense - a limited sense - he is right. In another sense,
however, even though Ackerman recognizes and anticipates a plu
rality of founding moments, all of these emerge from the same sin
gular source, are recognized by the same singular set of criteria, and
have the same singular status. This is no accident; Ackerman's "re
constructive" history is history with an attitude. It is a history
designed for use and implementation by The Court (or the courts),
and as such it is driven - like all attempts to produce or reform
American law - toward the production of a single, conclusive, uni
tary, monistic norm.54
This drive to recognize a singular moment or moments necessar
ily seeks to freeze the frame - a unitary paramount norm accepted
by a single subject in one particular context - in a way that extends
that frame through political and legal time. It is the mysticism of
the moment of foundation that negotiates the temporal dilemmas
of liberal justification. For it is through the moment of foundation
that the expanse of constitutional and legal time is referred back to
a single unifying moment. Thus, a single moment can span and reg
ulate an expanse of time extending indefinitely into the future.
THE RHETORIC OF LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION
It is in these ways that liberal justification refashions the identi
ties and relations of the critical terms of the popular constitutional
myth. Through an equilibrating action, each of the terms is ren
dered consonant with the others. Whether called "reflective equi
librium" (as in Rawls), the "internal perspective" (as in Dworkin),
or "reciprocal constitution" (as in Piss), the regulative image pro
duced by proponents of liberal justification is that of the circle.55
Each crucial term in this circle must be adjusted, refined, and
elaborated so that it is consonant with each of the other terms. The
circle of justification must be constructed so that the circular mo
tion operates smoothly - so that the mythic subject does indeed
consent to the paramount norm, so that the paramount norm be53. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-16.
54. Ironically, it is precisely Ackerman's need to produce legally cognizable criteria for

identifying founding moments that propels him to ensconce his otherwise interesting histori
cal narratives within the pedestrian prescriptive (and absolutely unbelievable) strictures of a
normative legalism. For a genealogical sketch of the legalistic drive to monism, see Pierre
Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053 (1993).
55. For another exploration of the circular organization of American law, see Pierre
Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HAR.v. L. REv. f!m, 914-18 (1997).
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comes authoritative in a founding moment, so that the political and
legal entailments of that paramount norm sustain the mythic
subject.
Not only must the circle of justification operate smoothly, but at
some point - and perhaps at several - it must induce the con
sumer of liberal justification to jump in. That is, the consumer must
be induced to enter the circle in order to complete, if only symboli
cally, its crucial circular operations. Through whatever entry point,
the consumer must identify with the mythic subject, subordinate
himself to the founding moment, and choose the paramount norm.
The circular motion of liberal justification must become the con
sumer's own. As Frank Michelman puts it, "The argument, then, is
that the philosophical project of political liberalism is possible for
us (if it is) because, as it happens, a certain conception of the person
appeals to us as an account of a truth of our being."56 How, then,
does liberal justification induce the entry of the consumer into the
circle? What is important here is not only that the consumer enter
the circle of justification, but that he do so in a liberal fashion. He
must choose liberal constitutionalism as authoritative, and he must
do so on the basis of reason. 51

fn asking how the consumer is induced to enter the circle of
liberal justification, I have deliberately represented the consumer as
being outside the circle of liberal justification. This location of the
consumer outside the circle is in important ways wrong, as dis
cussed later, but it is (1) consistent with the self-representations of
liberal justification, and (2) helpful to elucidate the rhetorical tech
niques through which liberal thinkers persuade their consumers to
enter the circle.
Consonant with this representation of the consumer as outside
the machinations of the myth, liberal justification confronts the con
sumer with a momentous decision - a decision either for or against
liberalism. Liberal justification almost invariably confronts its con
sumer with an either/or choice: choose the myth or face perdition.
Within the circle there is something good, appealing, admirable,
necessary, sensible, reasonable (this is liberalism), while on the
outside there is something bad, unappealing, contemptible, avoid
able, senseless, and unreasonable (this is the antithesis of liberalism

56. Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1831 (1994)
(book review).
57. See, e.g., GAUS, supra note 9, at 129, 292 ("Liberal politics requires, first that citizens
recognize their moral conunitment to justify their demands on each other
).
• • • •"
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and goes by names such as chaos, tyranny, totalitarianism, and so
on).
This specific use of the either/or structure is not merely an inci
dental or hyperbolic rhetorical gesture. On the contrary, it is an
essential aspect of liberal justification. It is essential because liberal
justification requires that the consumer make a choice for an entire
system of political governance. That is precisely the logic of justifi
cation instantiated by the idea of a paramount norm: for liberal
thinkers, the point is precisely to get the consumer to consent to the
paramount norm. Once that is achieved, the hierarchical superior
ity and overarching character of the paramount norm guarantee as
a matter of course that the rest of the liberal vision, in all its con
crete detail, is "on the whole" justified. To put it another way,
within the liberal vision, consent to the paramount norm directly
and necessarily entails consent to a whole series of institutions and
practices that are authorized by the paramount norm. Once the
paramount norm is accepted, it is as if the entire liberal pinball
machine lights up.ss
How is this consent elicited from the consumer? How is the
consumer induced to enter the circle of justification and perform its
actions as her own? At stake here are rhetorical negotiations be
tween the mythic representations of liberal justification and the so
cial conditions of the consumer.

FEAR, SHAME, SEDUCTION, AND ROMANCE
Part of the answer is emotion. It is through the medium of emo
tion - through fear, shame, seduction, and romance - that the
consumer of liberal justification is induced to enter the circle of jus
tification. The irony of this answer, given the insistence of liberal
justification on choice and rationality, is worthy of some considera
tion. But for now, let us consider the role of emotion in liberal
justification.
The consumer of liberal justification must come to view the
mythic subject as a fitting representation of herself and thus come
to view the paramount norm as something to which she chooses to
submit. There are two important and often intertwined moments
here.
One moment entails the reconstruction of the consumer's self
identity so that she chooses submission to the paramount norm.
This reconstruction typically entails inducing the consumer to un58. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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derstand herself as an abstracted individual - an autonomous, self
directing, coherent self - ready to choose submission to the para
mount norm. This is quite a feat, for the consumer must be induced
to understand this abstract liberal subject - what Merleau-Ponty
called the empty subject59 - as a fitting re-presentation and repre
sentative of herself, her condition, needs, wants, orientations, tastes,
and so on. The consumer must come to believe that this abstracted

subject, this universal subject, somehow accurately represents her
core, inner self, in its essence, at its best, at its truest. Liberal rheto

ric will by turns frighten, shame, seduce, and even romance the con

sumer into taking on the identity and the perspective of the liberal
subject.
The second important moment is the prompting of an actual
choice. True, much of the groundwork for this "choosing" has al
ready been accomplished in the refashioning of the consumer's
identity as an abstracted individual subject. But more is required.
The consumer must actually choose submission to this particular
paramount norm. The consumer's motivations must be elicited and
evoked so that she is prompted to choose. Once again the con
sumer is, by turns, frightened into submission, shamed into acquies
cence, s educed into consent, or ultimately romanced into
identification with the paramount norm.
Hobbes's defense of Leviathan as protection against a life that
would otherwise be nasty, brutish, and short is perhaps the most
famous example of the liberal - or rather proto-liberal - use of
fear to induce submission.6° The success of the Hobbesian gesture
depends upon the credibility of a rhetoric of static opposition: on
this side, liberal belief; on that side, terror, tyranny, and totalitari
anism. The rhetorical premise is that liberal belief has a robust
ontological identity - an essence that renders liberal belief (and its
political institutions) at once distinct from and impervious to terror
and tyranny. Implicit in this rhetoric is the supposition that some
thing about liberal belief - never specified and always presumed
- prevents liberal belief - and its political institutions - from
evolving or collapsing into totalitarianism, terror, and tyranny.

59. "There are at bottom only two ideas of subjectivity - that of empty, unfettered, and
universal subjectivity, and that of full subjectivity sucked down into the world - and it is the
same idea
MAURICE MERLEAU-PoNTY, Everywhere and Nowhere, in SIGNS 126, 154
(John Wild ed. & Richard C. McCleary trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1964) (1960).
60. Hobbes frames the appeal of "Leviathan" (the state) on the basis of an either/or:
Either Leviathan or the "war . . . of every man, against every man." THOMAS HOBBES, LBVI·
ATIIAN 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
. • • ."
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This is reminiscent of the rhetoric now so common in contempo
rary fear-advertising: "Afraid of cancer? Eat this everyday."
"Afraid of totalitarian regimes or chaos? Choose liberal belief." In
both cases, of course, there is plenty to fear. But in both cases liberalism or cereal - it is doubtful that the precautions are fully
efficacious.
The either/or gesture has been repeated many times, as liberals
have sought to represent liberal belief and its political institutions
as a bulwark against totalitarianism, terror, and tyranny. The ges
ture implies that only a choice for liberalism - often, the author's
version of liberalism
will forestall the advent of inhuman condi
tions. Bruce Ackerman, a leading liberal thinker, recently upped
the emotional ante by personalizing the gesture. As he put it, "Are
you quite sure that it is in your self-interest to scoff at the very idea
-

of citizenship, when you may later want to protect your own hide by
appealing to others to take a broad view of the public good?"61 In a

sense, this gesture resembles emotional blackmail: accept the lib
eral justification or you may find yourself unable to protect your
interests, perhaps even yourself.
Interestingly, this gesture seems to work (at least some of the
time) even though it is a non sequitur. Indeed, given that whether
or not the consumer (you) chooses to be for or against liberalism is
of no moment whatsoever for the survival or continuation of the
liberal state, why should anyone be persuaded by this gesture to
choose liberalism?
One answer is fear. Fear, after all, does not have to be rational.
But there is more to it than that. The Hobbesian gesture is perhaps
aimed not so much at inducing a choice for liberalism as it is aimed
at raising the stakes for the consumer. The momentous character of
the choice - liberalism or tyranny - sets the scene for the intro
duction of other motivating forces - namely, shaming and seduc
tion. The following passage, drawn from Bruce Ackerman's recent
work, presents an excellent example of the interplay of seduction
and shame. As Ackerman intimates, either you follow him on the
pathways of dignity and nobility or you are a grunting animal:
You are not alone on Earth; you share your time and space with
others, lots of others, who differ with you about lots of things. How to
come to terms with this basic fact? You may simply seek to oppress
others through force and fraud. Or you may try to come to terms
with them about the best way to associate together. Isn't there a cer
tain dignity in the second course? Isn't there something noble in call-

61. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasis added).
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ing upon yourself, by calling upon others, to put some intelligible
form upon your social life together? If we are not to live as mere
brutes, grunting past one another in the night, surely we owe at least
this much to each other?62

Seduction is also an important part of the liberal rhetoric, which
typically goes to great lengths to praise the consumer who accepts
the liberal justification. Such a consumer is praised for her moral
concern, her moral acumen, and her regard for others. Frank
Michelman, referring to a constitutional liberal, puts it this way:
"Who can do better than to live the best she can according to the
sort of being she finds herself believing herself to be . . ?"63 In
addition, the consumer who acquiesces in the liberal justification is
praised not only for her moral qualities, but also for her reason and
reasonableness.
.

On the other side of seduction is shame. The consumer who
does not accede to the liberal justification is threatened with shame
and possibly moral or intellectual exile. In Ackerman's work, the
nonconforming consumers are degraded to the status of animal life
- brutes "grunting past one another in the night." In Michelman's
work, the failure to accede to the Rawlsian political vision has per
sonal implications for whether the consumer is truly a human being
or not. Indeed, rejection of the Rawlsian vision calls into question
"whether (for this purpose) your kind is anything less than the
human kind."64
The intensity of these shaming devices serves not only to induce
a choice for liberalism but also to induce consumers to participate
in the practice of liberal justification itself - to continue the con
versation within the terms established by liberal justification. Here
too, the either/or rhetorical structure performs quite efficaciously.
Either one engages in the practice of liberal justification or one is
reduced to the unenviable status of the grunting brute, the
inhuman.
These examples are but some of the more flamboyant instances
of shaming rhetoric in the literature of liberal justification. They
are extreme manifestations of a more muted, but prevalent, ethos
of shame. Liberal shaming portrays the mature, responsible, rea
sonable, coherent, integrated self as one that will choose liberalism.
Meanwhile, the rejection of liberalism is depicted as the product of
character flaws - childish romanticism and frivolity (often ascribed
62. Id. at 313-14.
63. Michelman, supra note 56, at 1832.
64. Id. at 1833.
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to the extreme left) , or crude egoism and cr uelty (often ascribed to
the extreme right).
B eyond fear, shame, and seduction, li beral justificati on also em
ploys romance. This is where the liberal plot picks up. L iberal ro
mance, like many other forms of political romance, enacts a
narrative of reconcili ation. Indeed, liberal justifi cation promises to
dissolve a series of troublesome binary oppositiop. s that have
marked not only philosophy, but also ethi cs, personality, and li fe
itself. It is in the promise to dissolve the active man ifestations of
these oppositi ons that li beral justifi cation achi eves its appeal and its
greatness. For instance, liberal justification promises to reconcile
the indivi dual wi th the community,65 the concrete wi th the univer
sal,66 reason with authority,67 ethic with interest,68 and is with
ought.69
Moreover, liberal ju stification promises such reconci liations not
just conceptually, but politically in our institutions, socially in our
culture, and emotionally in our personal lives. L iberal justi fication
promises, in short, to reunite liberal citiz ens with each other, with
themselves, and with th eir fate.
Consider, as an example, the promise to reconci le the individual
with the community - private cost with social cost, private interest
wi th public interest, and so on. Liberal justification promises to
reconcile these oppositions through the rhetorical trope of self-rule,
of self-governm ent, of self- legislation, or, as many i n Ameri ca call
it, " popular sovereignty. " In the liberaljustifi cation, the paramount
norm is ruling. It rules us. B ut, it has been chosen by us. In a
fundamental sense the paramount norm is us. We are, in short,
ruled by ourselves.
L iberal justification thus promises communal redemption: We
shall be as one again. We are i nvi ted to come home and to belong
once more. The seductive appeal of this romance of reconciliation
is not to be d� nied. A nd it is indeed regularly invoked by liberal
thinkers. For example, B ruce A ckerman writes:
Behold, then ... an America in which a rediscovered Constitution is
the subject of an ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals,
and the people at large; an America in which this dialogue between
theory and practice allows the citizenry, and its political representa-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2; RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
See generally FJSS, supra note 46.
See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
See generally DWORKIN, supra note 2.
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tives, a deepening sense of its historical identity as it faces the trans
forming challenges of the future.10

This is moving stuff. The question is, what does it move? One an
swer is that it is supposed to move the readers. It is supposed to
move them to a singular, unifying, and "deepening sense of [their]
historical identity."71
The use of such emotional devices in liberal justification is
rather ironic. Liberal justification, true to its form, insists that its
consumers make a reasoned choice for liberal constitutionalism. In
deed, this reasoned choice is an essential aspect of liberal belief.
The choice for the liberal state must appear the reasoned choice of
a coherent, self-directing, autonomous individual subject. Unlike
the circles of belief exemplified in theocratic, fascistic, or commu
nist ideologies, liberalism depends upon a demonstration that it can
be the outcome of reasoned choice by those who are ruled. It is
thus ironic that the addressee of liberal justification is systemati
cally frightened, shamed, seduced, and romanced into acquiescence.
Perhaps the use of such emotional devices can be reconciled
with the liberal insistence on reasoned choice. Still, it is no easy
task, for in liberal justification fear, shame, seduction, and romance
are used not merely to influence choice, but, more problematically,
to compensate for a lack of knowledge and for the inadequacy of
reason in making such a choice. Thus, the Hobbesian gesture
evokes fear to represent the alternative to liberalism as essentially
bleak and undesirable, while it deploys romance to eclipse an un
known political future with enticing images of communal reconcilia
tion and noble deeds. Hence, when knowledge and reason fall
short of liberal ambitions, it is emotion that takes up the slack.
More problematic still for liberal justification, the use of these
emotional devices constructs a coercive frame within which the ad
dressee must exercise his reasoned choice. The either/or structure
of the Hobbesian choice is both elicited and reinforced through
fear, shame, and seduction. The coercion here may be difficult to
appreciate, for if is coercion aimed at producing a choice - and
within liberal thought, choice and coercion are offered as mutually
exclusive.72 Yet, the coercion of liberal justification lies precisely in
70. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
71. Id.
72. On this point, consider the amusing interchange between Richard Epstein and Gary
Peller in a 1988 Cornell Law Review symposium. See Richard A. Epstein, The Classical
Legal Tradition, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 292 (1988); Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of Law,

73 CoRNELL L. REv. 300 (1988); Discussion: The Classical Theory of Law, 13 CORNELL L.
REv. 310 (1988).
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forcing its consumer to choose for or against liberalism. And not
only is the consumer forced to choose, he is forced to believe that
this choice matters greatly. Indeed, one could hardly imagine a per
son placed in Rawls's original position saying back to his author:
Look here dear author, the sort of predicament that you have put me
in is really quite preposterous. Human beings, as you know, are not
"persons in the original position." Human life is not lived well ab
stractly. And politics do not generally run from the top down. What
is more, reason would require that I know a great deal more about my
situation before I seal my fate. I refuse to play, I refuse to decide.
The choices you are giving me have been forced upon me and as a
human being - or at least human-being-in-waiting - I believe that it
is simply not rational to participate in this exercise.

Why is it that a person in the original position would not say
this? The short answer is that he has been constructed not to say
this. What about the "real" consumer of liberal justification? Is
this someone equipped to resist the rhetoric of liberal justification?
No.
The "real" consumer of liberal justification is already deeply en
sconced in the circles of liberal justification, for he is himself al
ready a mythified construction. As intimated earlier, the image of
the consumer as someone induced from the outside to enter the cir
cle of liberal justification is wrong. In many important senses, the
consumer is already within the circles of liberal justification.
It is time to take stock of the circles.
THE RHETORIC OF THE CIRCLE

The Circle of Politics
The first circle of liberal justification is perhaps the most easily
recognizable. This is a circle that entails a sovereign people (a
mythic subject) choosing a constitution (a paramount norm) that
sustains and protects the sovereign people (the mythic subject).
Liberal justification demands an equilibration between the para
mount norm and its subjects. This circularity is explicit in the vari
ous attempts at liberal justification.

Myth on Myth
More problematic still for liberal justification is the myth on
myth circularity. Liberal justification as myth does not operate
upon some unprocessed, unmediated political reality. Rather, it op
erates upon artifacts and relations constructed through the popular
constitutional mythology. In other words, liberal justification is -
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like all successful myth - a meta-myth. As myth, liberal justifica
tion enables the interpretation - and validation - of a prior, more
vulgar, but also more pervasive version of itself. All the referents
of liberal justification - the state, rights, liberty, freedom, the con
stitution, the self, and so on - are all already artifactual references
encoded with the myth of liberal constitutionalism.
Liberal justification, in short, intervenes at a point where mythi
cal representation has already done much of its work. This point
can be corroborated by an examination of the leading works of lib
eral justification. In such works, there is virtually never any critical
inquiry into the ontological status and the political efficacy of refer
ents such as rights, liberty, norms, values, the state, reason, auton
omy, the self, and the like. Liberal justification may well place the
substantive meanings of these terms in question - and indeed often
does - but their referentiality to something real, stable, and so
cially and politically efficacious is never seriously in doubt.73 In
deed, the sometimes heated internecine squabbles among liberals
as to the precise meaning or significance of these terms ironically
reinforces their apparent reality. The liberal thinker approaches a
category such as "rights" with the same degree of credulity that a
medieval scholar approaches the category of "angels," or a commu
nist apparatchik the category of "bourgeoisie."
This myth-on-myth circularity helps explain a certain shallow
ness to the enterprise of liberal justification. In part, this shallow
ness is quite understandable. The mythology of liberalism is an
already actualized mythology: many of the categories of lived social
and political existence are liberal categories. The dominant image
of human beings as liberal individual subjects thus is not just an
intellectual construction of liberal thinkers; it is also the prevailing
self-image throughout American society. Similarly, the term
"rights" is not just some bit of liberal political utopianism. It is a
recurrent and, in important ways, consequential utterance routinely
invoked by lawyers, judges, political groups, ethnic groups, citizens,
children, and so on. Given the apparent social and political actuali
zation of liberal categories, it is understandable that liberal thinkers
would presume that liberal categories such as rights, liberty, norms,
values, the state, reason, autonomy, and the self are ontologically
referential and politically efficacious.
But this presumption is nonetheless a kind of ontological cate
gory mistake. The prevalence of liberal categories in American so73. See Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1681 (1996).
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ciety does not establish their ontological identity; it does not
establish whether liberal categories such as "individual rights" are
on the order of rocks, trees, dollar bills, rubles, words, advertising
images, or angels. Similarly, the prevalence of popular belief in lib
eral categories such as individual rights in no way establishes the
social and political roles and efficacy of such referents.
This myth-on-myth circularity is precisely what enables liberal
justification to eschew inquiry into the ontological identity and the
social and political roles of the key liberal referents - rights, lib
erty, norms, values, the state, reason, autonomy, the self, and so on.
Hence, what liberalism sets out to justify is its own description of the
world. This would not be a useless task if liberal justification were a
bit more critical of its own description of the world. But this is
something it does not do and indeed cannot do without transform
ing itself into a significantly different intellectual enterprise.
The myth-on-myth circularity belies the critical pretensions of
liberal justification. Indeed, practitioners of liberal justification
often represent that the theoretical articulation of a liberal ideal
serves as a basis for criticism of liberal practice, a benchmark by
which to measure the successes and failures of concrete practice.
This claim - one that is generally unsupported - loses much of its
plausibility and appeal once one recognizes that it is not liberal
practice per se that will be called to account in the court of liberal
theory. Rather, what will be called to account is an already mythol
ogized representation of practice - a representation of practice al
ready inscribed in terms of the liberal mythology.
What is promised is an examination of the gap between the
ideal and the reality. What is delivered is an examination of the gap
between a higher order ideal (liberal justification) and a lower or
der ideal (popular liberal mythology). Ironically, while the higher
order ideal is often represented as controlling the lower order ideal,
it is often little more than an idealized abstraction of the lower or
der ideal.

The Circle of the Mythifi.ed Subject
Liberal justification, as suggested, does its work not only by
fashioning an image of the liberal state that conforms to its subjects,
but by shaping its subjects - its consumers - to conform to the
idea of the liberal state. The very configuration of the liberal sub
ject is a mimesis of the liberal state.
In one sense, this is quite unremarkable. It cannot be of sur
prise - given the political and social actualization of liberalism -
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that the consumer of liberal justification is someone whose political
world is already mapped out in liberal categories. Moreover, in
light of the social and political inscription of categories such as
rights, reason, norms, choice, deliberation, and so on, it comes as no
surprise that the consumer of liberal justification already under
stands his world as operationally organized in terms of these kinds
of artifacts and relations. Indeed, the consumer of liberal justifica
tion is himself already constructed as a mimesis of the liberal state.
The liberal individual subject is a representation of the self that is
circulated throughout the culture of liberal society - its literature,
advertisements, schooling, morality, religion, and so on. What lib
eral justification does (more myth-on-myth) is refine, elaborate,
and reinforce this particular self-representation.
The point is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in John Rawls's
elaboration of the character of persons in the original position. Ac
cording to Rawls, the original position is an artificial construction
designed "to model both freedom and equality and restrictions on
reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which
agreement would be made by the parties [the persons in the origi
nal position] as citizens' representatives."74 The consumer, of
course, is invited to consider what would be a fair characteristic to
attribute to such mythical persons.
It turns out that the person in the original position has certain
character traits and confronts political questions that are them
selves already instantiations of the liberal mythology. This is a per
son who is stripped of all information about his actual status in
society, his particular predilections and tastes. He is told that he
may want to pursue any number of life plans and that he values
certain basic goods generally thought necessary to the pursuit of
those life plans: liberties, wealth, income, and the bases of self
respect. He is self-interested, rational, and not given to envy.7s
74. RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 26.
75. Hence persons in the original positions are:
(1) deprived of knowledge of their actual social or economic positions, and their partic
ular conceptions of the good life, their actual talents, or their psychological propensities;
(2) limited in their choices to "a short list of alternatives given by the tradition of moral
and political philosophy";
(3) limited to choosing principles that apply to the basic structure of the society;
(4) limited to choosing certain instrumentally necessary primary goods defined as basic
liberties, powers, and prerogatives of office, income, wealth, and the social bases of self
respect;
(5) endowed with means/ends rationality; and
(6) endowed with rational autonomy.
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, at 118-50.

October

1997]

Liberal Justification

35

In short, persons in the original position are constructed as ahis
torical, abstracted, depersonalized, autonomous, self-directing, inte
grated, unified, but virtually empty subjects.76 They are sketches,
schemas, formal outlines of a human being. They are, as Rawls
himself repeatedly insists, "representations."77 Their mission in life
is to represent the interests of fully fleshed human beings who are
rich in experiences, hopes, tastes, and so on.7s
Persons in the original position know that they are mere repre
sentations and that the subjects they represent will have specific
tastes, preferences, ambitions, hopes, and fears. The represented
will be fully fleshed-out human beings.
What we have in the Rawlsian framework is the familiar drama
of liberal representation - one in which empty subjects (that is,
persons in the original position) represent full subjects (that is, live
human beings) and lay down the ruling norms for the latter. The
Rawlsian scheme is thus but one instance of a classic liberal separa
tion between the empty subject and the full subject. This separa
tion usually tacks the following associations:
The Empty Subject Is:
The Full Subject Is:

Universal
Abstract
Transcendental
Depersonalized
Ahistorical
Public
Reason
Objective

Particular
Concrete
Contingent
Personal
Historical
Private
Desire
Subjective

Once the full and the empty subjects are separated in this way, lib
eral justification typically establishes certain relations between the
empty subject and the full subject. The empty subject must be au
thorized to represent and to legislate for the full subject.

In Rawls's work, as in liberal justification generally, it is crucial
that the empty subject be considered a legitimate representation of
76. For a criticism of Rawls's tbeory of justice in terms of tbe abstract character of his
persons in tbe original position, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND TiiE LIMITS OF
JurnCE (1982).
77.
78.

See RAWLS, PounCAL LIBERALISM,

supra note 2, at 24, 27, 35.

Hence, tbey are close approximations of what Merleau-Ponty once called "the empty
subject." The empty subject is one version, or rather one mode, of tbe liberal individual
subject. The empty subject is pictured as autonomous, coherent, self-directing, and unified.
It is abstract, depersonalized, ahistorical, and seemingly universal. This is the kind of subject
tbat is typically addressed and called fortb in philosophy seminars and law school classes tbis is tbe individual subject as greatest common denominator, tbe subject who can rise above
his or her own particular circumstances. The emptiness of tbis subject stems precisely from
tbe fact tbat, in order to represent everyone, tbis subject must be stripped of all particular
content. See MERLEAu-PoNTY, supra note 59, at 154.
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the full subject. The empty subject must perform as a fitting sym
bolic, psychological, and political representation of the full subject.
The reason is obvious: the consumer of liberal justification - who
is both an empty and a full subject - must acquiesce to his repre
sentation by the empty subject. He must accept the notion that it is
reasonable to allow empty subjects to choose norms for full sub
jects. He is asked to accede to the logic of legitimate representa
tion; that as a full subject, his interests will be protected because the
only legitimate role of the empty subject is to represent those inter
ests - not to substitute better ones, not to legislate morality.
The representation of the empty subject entitles the empty sub
ject to legislate for the full subject - to choose the norms by which
the full subject will live. This is, of course, precisely what is asked
of persons in the original position and of all other consumers of
liberal justification. They are asked as empty subjects to decide
upon ultimate norms to govern the conduct of full subjects.79
The authorization of the empty subject to represent and legis
late for the full subject is not only played out in liberal justification,
but will indeed be inscribed repeatedly in the very laws of the lib
eral state. Hence, the image of the subject - the person protected
by the rights contained in the Constitution - is abstract, universal,
and essentially formal. Similarly, the dominant image of the judge
who applies the law of the liberal state is that of a subject who is
neutral, detached, dispassionate, and above the fray. Indeed, a
judge can lay claim to the authority of the community, and to the
authority to represent its interests, to the extent that he can repre
s ent hims elf as an empty subj ect - abstract, universal,
depersonalized.
How exactly does liberal justification induce the consumer to
allow the empty subject to represent and legislate for the full sub
ject? The short answer is that liberal justification invites the con
sumer to identify with the empty subject. Significantly, the
consumer consulted here is the consumer as both empty and as full
subject. In fact, Rawls's original position might be seen as a kind of
pedagogical device designed to train the full subject to frame and
refashion his arguments in terms of public reason - that is, in
terms that are worthy of consideration by an empty subject.
79. The pedigree for this move is considerable. It is implicit, for instance, in Kant's cate
gorical imperative which summons an empty subject to lay down the rule for the full subject
See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 38-46,
54-56 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1949).
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The action of liberal justification occurs both on the level of the
individual and on the level of the collective. On the level of the
individual, liberal justification, while recognizing both the impor
tance of the empty as well as the full subject, strives to produce an
integration of the full subject by the empty subject. The image of
the self championed by liberal ethics is of a self that is integrated,
coherent, consistent, centered - an image not unlike a circle. The
empty subject envelops the richness and variety of the full subject
and disciplines this full subject to the formal laws of the empty sub
ject: autonomy, coherence, consistency, unity. All aspects of per
sonality are linked in a continuous integrated whole - in short, the
image of a bounded, gapless, figure - not unlike that of a circle.
Notice that in this construction of the self, the full subject is
neither ignored nor jettisoned. The full subject is merely
subordinated to the formal laws of the empty subject. Thus
emerges a hierarchy, one in which the empty subject is authorized
to rule. This subordination of the full subject to the law of the
empty subject is effectuated by addressing the consumer both as
empty and full subject. By addressing the consumer as an empty
subject, liberal justification seduces or shames her into assuming
this more noble and more ethically appealing version of herself, fur
ther causing her to put aside her own particular tastes, preferences,
idiosyncrasies, and other concrete aspects. By addressing the con
sumer as a full subject, liberal justification uses greed and fear to
convince the consumer that it is in her own interest
within her
own particular tastes, preferences, and idiosyncrasies as a full sub
ject - to acquiesce in the rules laid down by the empty subject.
-

Once the full subject has acceded to the rule of the empty subject,
the same formal hierarchy is then reproduced on the political level.
Once having taken on this particular psychological configuration,
the consumer will easily - indeed, naturally - accede to its polit
ical equivalent. From a psychological representation of the self -

as a full subject ruled psychologically by an empty subject - we
move to a political representation of the self - as a full subject
ruled politically by an empty subject. The movement can be sche
matized as followsso:

Full
Psychological
Subject

enveloped
and
ruled by

Empty
Psychological
Subject

=

Liberal Image
of Full Political
Subject

80. The schematization here tracks Roland Barthes's representation of language and
myth as two "staggered" semiological systems. See BARnras, supra note 1, at 115.
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=

Liberal
Image
of Politics

It is crucial to liberal justification to establish (1) the separation be
tween the empty and the full subject, as well as the authority of the
empty subject to (2) represent and (3) legislate for the full subject.
More is accomplished in these three moves than might at first ap
pear. Each of these three moves yields a crucial implication.

The separation of the full and the empty subject enables liberal
justification to train its consumer to effectuate this separation as a
matter of her own psychological structure. In effect, liberal justifi
cation trains its consumer to assume the identity of the empty sub
ject - to abstract herself from her peculiar circumstances, her
particular engagements, her specific tastes and preferences. Once
the psychological separation between the full and the empty subject
is in place in the consumer, she will, of course, choose a political
form that corresponds to her dual essence - as both an empty and
a full subject. The psychological separation of the empty subject
from the full subject corresponds to a political separation between
the liberal state and civil society, between the public realm and the
private sector.s1
This correspondence between the psychological and the political
in liberal justification is also reflected in the relation known as rep
resentation for the full subject. Just as the consumer of liberal justi
fication understands the relation of empty and full subject to be one
of representation, so too will she understand the relation between
state and civil society, public realm and private realm, to be a rela
tion of representation. This means that the state cannot legiti
mately represent interests beyond those shared within civil society.
Its powers, like those of the empty subject, are limited. The limited
representation of the full subject by the empty subject is thus repro
duced at the political level. The limited character of state power, in
·
turn, evokes the characteristic anxiety of the liberal thinker over
what social, institutional, and discursive mechanisms can best main
tain the limits on state power: the problematics of judicial review,
the countermajoritarian difficulty, the intertemporal difficulty, sep
aration of powers, and so on.
81. Karl Marx's essay On the Jewish Question remains perhaps the best demonstration of
how this distinction is crucial to - indeed constitutive of - the liberal democratic state. See
KARL MARx, On the Jewish Question (1843}, reprinted in EARLY WRITINGS 211 (Rodney
Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage Books 1975).
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Legislation is yet another crucial point of correspondence be
tween the psychology and the politics of liberal justification. The
notion that the empty subject can legislate for the full subject im
plies that the former is authorized to govern the actions of the latter
- and that the full subject will conduct its affairs within the norms
established by the empty subject. This relation of legislation is re
produced at the political level. The consumer of liberal justifica
tion, in identifying with the empty subject, authorizes the latter to
lay down the law. Inasmuch as the empty subject is identified with
the public sector and the full subject with the private realm, the
relation is transposed from one set to the other: just as the empty
subject is authorized to lay down the law for the full subject, the
state is authorized to lay down the law for civil society.
In the end, perhaps liberal justification seems so persuasive to
the consumer precisely became the liberal state is already in the con
sumer's head. There is an isomorphic resemblance between the
psychological configurations of the liberal subject and the crucial
political configurations of the liberal state.
And if, in some moments, liberal justification seems shallow, it
is precisely because while claiming to be argument - a progression
of reasoning - it is instead a circular activity. Indeed, liberal justi
fication is often little more than a game of mirrors in which a partic
ular aesthetic configuration is reflected from the plane of
psychology to the plane of politics (and vice versa). The political
configuration of liberal justification is already implanted in the psy
chology of the consumer. The consumer is then invited to choose a
form of political organization appropriate to that psychology.82
And so on.
What then sustains this liberal psychology? Part of an answer
appears if we trace the path of the circle of the mythified subject:
Liberal psychology renders liberal justification possible, and liberal
justification establishes the liberal subject by repeatedly positing
that subject and rehearsing its aesthetic.83 If liberal justification can
ever begin to do its work, it is in virtue of an articulated premise:
"Assume you are an individual liberal subject. O.K. now, let's
talk." There is little difference here, in terms of argumentative aes82. This, of course, is somewhat circular. This circularity, in and of itself, is not necessar
ily a problem. It does, however, become a problem once the shallowness of the circle be
comes apparent. At that point, the circularity has already ceased to do its job. Similarly, the
circularity becomes a problem once it is recognized that the circularity was supposed to res
urrect the foundations and has instead turned out to be a circle resting, as it were, on its
nonexistent bottom. Again, at this point, the circularity has ceased to do its job.
83. See Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, supra note 3.
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thetics, from those who would say, "Assume you are one of God's
creatures. O.K. now, let's talk." Or yet again: "Assume you are
the universal class. O.K. now, let's talk." The trick is to presume
into existence precisely the sort of psychological ontology that con
duces the desired politics - and what is more, to do so without
being seen.84
It is a good trick, possibly an unavoidable trick. But that does
not guarantee its success. It can fail. The reason is simple: while
all politics must serve to establish and maintain the kind of subject
necessary for its continued existence, politics presumes (quite im
possibly) that it controls the historical, psychological, and cultural
conditions that render it possible. In virtue of this blind moment of
presumption, politics must fail. In the case of liberal justification,
the fission of the individual subject into a full subject regulated by
an empty subject can seem as natural as existence itself. Then, in
the next moment, it can seem ludicrous.ss
In sum, the circle of the mythified subject identifies a circle be
tween liberal psychology and liberal politics. The circle entails pro
ducing in the consumer a particular aesthetic configuration - an
empty subject ruling a full subject - that is then transposed to the
political plane. The same relations of separation, representation,
and legislation are then enacted on the plane of politics. This brings
us to yet another circle.

The Circle of Justification
In liberal justification, the circle of the mythified subject is en
compassed by another circle. This is the circle of justification. This
circle can be described in terms of a relation between form and
meaning.
In any myth, as Roland Barthes suggests, there is a kind of
structural ubiquity between its meaning and its form; a structural
ubiquity between the "language object" and the "meta-language. "86
This point is easily illustrated in the context of liberal constitution
alism. The liberal constitutional mythology posits a sovereign peo
ple who, through their representatives, establish at a particular
point in time a constitution that sets forth the powers and the limits
of legitimate government. This myth is given a naturalized and con
cretized expression through "meaning." As an illustration of such a
84. See id. at 1630-31.
85. See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 3, at 1670-71.
86.

BARnms, supra note 1, at 123.
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naturalized and concretized expression, one might say that the sub
stantive meaning of the liberal constitutional myth is that, in 1787,
certain political leaders convened in Philadelphia where they
drafted the Constitution - a document that sets forth in various
articles the powers of the various agencies of government. But the
myth also has the crucial dimension of "form." As form, one might
say that the liberal constitutional myth establishes that political
governance is justified when a mythic subject in the exercise of de
liberative self-rule chooses a paramount norm to regulate all
subordinate political activity.
As Barthes notes, "[T]he signification of the myth is constituted
by a sort of constantly moving turnstile which presents alternately
the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language-object and a
metalanguage . . ."En For example, if one had to identify the·mean
ing and form of the liberal constitutional mythology, one might do
so as follows:
.

Meaning
(Language-object)
1787

The Framers (Madison,
Hamilton, etc.)
The Constitution of 1787
Ratification

Form
\Mf"
talanguage)
Founding Moment
The Mythic Subject
The Paramount Norm
Consent/Self-Rule

While this rendition of the meaning and form of the liberal consti
tutional mythology may be illustrative, a note of caution is neces
sary. This rendition leads to the supposition that myth lends itself
to a noncontroversial distinction and identification of its meaning
and its form, of its language-objects and its metalanguage. But the
power of myth lies precisely in the fact that what comprises its form
and what comprises its meaning is undecidable. Meaning and form,
language-object and metalanguage, are best conceptualized not as
determinate entities, but as relations - ultimately unspecifiable
relations.
The point can be seen within the context of liberal justification.
In liberal justification there is a structural undecidability as to
whether its principal orientation is focused on meaning, the
language-objects of the constitutional myth, or instead on the form,
the metalanguage of the constitutional myth.
One could say that some constitutional thinkers understand the
tasks of liberal justification as focused on the language-objects of
87. Id.
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the constitutional myth. Here one would include the views of so
called literalists, strict constructionists, originalists, intentionalists,
and textualists.ss Their understanding of the constitutional myth is
very much defined by what they take to be its specific meaning, its
particular language-objects.s9
In contrast to those who understand the constitutional myth in
terms of its meaning or its language-objects, some constitutional
thinkers could be described as committed to the myth in terms of its
form or its metalanguage. This would include "tjieorists,"
"noninterpretivists," "loose constructionists," and "moral philoso
phers."90 Their views on the enterprise of constitutional thought
could be understood as an attempt to practice the metalanguage of
the constitutional myth - an attempt to reveal its essential animat
ing spirit. Their focus is on the form of the constitutional myth.91
Yet, this bipolar classification overstates the differing tendencies
between these two kinds of constitutional thinkers. As participants
in the myth, the orientations of both groups necessarily partake in
some observance of both the language-objects and the metalanguage
of the constitutional myth. Indeed, for those who participate in this
kind of myth-making or myth-rehearsing activity, there is a kind of
reciprocal relation - a circular movement b etween the
metalanguage and the language-objects of the constitutional myth.
It is, after all, the language-objects - 1787, the Constitution, ratifi
cation, amendment, and so on - that map out the form, the
metalanguage. At the same time, of course, it is the form - a sov
ereign people choosing to establish . . . and so on - that accords
the relevant language-objects their identity. As Barthes puts it,

88. See RAoUL BERGER, CoNoRESS v. THE SUPREME CouRT (1969); Robert H. Bork,
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 823 (1986);
Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1985); William Van
Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of
Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983).

89. The point is perhaps most evident in William Van Alstyne's attempt to suggest that
the problem of constitutional interpretation is properly focused on what he calls (with em
phasis) "This Constitution." See Van Alstyne, supra note 88.
90. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Michelman, supra note 2; Michael J. Perry, The
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985).
91. Michelman seems to elaborate the preconditions and the implications of dialogical
self-rule at a certain remove from the specific substantive content of the American constitu
tional order. See Michelman, supra note 2. The argument seems to strive for great fidelity to
the metalanguage of the constitutional myth, while paying little attention to its language
objects.
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"[t]he meaning is always there to present the form; the form is al
ways there to outdistance the meaning."92
Barthes's point is reflected in the leading works of liberal justifi
cation. For example, the point is elegantly, even if unwittingly, ex
emplified in the work of Ronald Dworkin, who recognizes a
reciprocal - that is to say, circular - relation between legal inter
pretation and its objects. Dworkin recognizes that the objects of
legal interpretation - what he calls "the institutional materials"93
- do not exist prior to interpretation. At the same time, Dworkin
also recognizes that legal interpretation does not exist indepen
dently of the materials in which it is instantiated. In Dworkin's
work, the "institutional materials" thus play the role of the
language-object, while his "best interpretation" plays the role of the
metalanguage. The relation of the two is one of circularity, of re
ciprocal constitution. We can see that a good number of liberal
thinkers reproduce this pattern in their theories:

Barthes

Language
objects

Metalanguage

�

Dworkin

Institutional
Materials

Best
Interpretation

Law as integrity

Rawls

Considered
Intuitions

Theory

Reflective
Equilibrium

Flss

Disciplining
Rules (as
meaning)

Disciplining
Rules (as form)

Objectivity in
Law

It is characteristic of the liberal thinkers to promise an ultimate rec
onciliation, a stabilization of the language-obj ect and
metalanguage. The Rawlsian reflective equilibrium that insists that
our considered convictions be matched up against our theory (and
vice versa) thus promises an ever-increasing convergence of the
two.94 Rawls promises convictions that are ever more in tune with
theory and a theory that is ever more in tune with convictions. Sim
ilarly, in Dworkin's work, the constant attempt of judges to make
law the best it can be, to formulate the best interpretation that best
explains the institutional materials, ultimately leads to a view of law
as integrity.9s The promise is that, over time, the institutional
92. BARTHES, supra note 1, at 123.
93. See DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 255, 405-06.
94. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERALISM, supra note 2, at 8.
95. See DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 255, 405-06.
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materials and the theory that best explains them will converge until,
in the end, "law works itself pure."96
Liberal thinkers thus exploit the possibilities of the constitu
tional myth by recasting the language-objects of the myth in terms
of its metalanguage and vice versa. Indeed, much of the current
intellectual focus of liberal justification is on producing new ac
counts that will bring about an "appropriate" relation of the
language-objects and the metalanguage of the constitutional myth.
Liberal thinkers thus strive to produce a new stabilized account
of the myth. Inasmuch as they are purveyors of the myth, they al
ways strive to provide some stabilized synthesis - some final ac
count that must be accepted as true.
To put it too bluntly, a great deal of "jurisprudential" theorizing
about the meaning of the United States Constitution reduces to
three stereotypical stances:
(1) There are those who insist upon redefining the language
objects of the myth in terms of the metalanguage of the myth.
Here the paramount example might be the work of Bruce Ack
erman, who uses the metalanguage of the constitutional myth
to create new constitutional language-objects - to wit, higher
lawmaking, foundational moments, a new mythic subject,
amendment outside Article V, and so on.97
(2) There are those who insist upon maintaining the language
obj ects of the myth while largely disregarding its
metalanguage. Here we would include the textualists and
originalists, including William Van Alstyne, Robert Bork, and
others.98
(3) Finally, there are those who show some awareness of the
reciprocal relation of the two aspects of the myth. Their un
derstanding ranges from the highly sophisticated, as exempli
fied by the work of Ronald Dworkin, to the more rudimentary,
as manifested in the work of Owen Fiss.99
But regardless of which of the three stances the liberal thinker as
sumes, he or she always strives to achieve some pleasing, stabilized
synthesis. Rather vexingly, that is precisely what cannot be had,
because, as Barthes admonished, "[t]he meaning is always there to
96. Ronald Dworkin, The 1984 Mccorkle Lecture: Law's Ambition for Itself, 71 VA. L.
173, 173 (1984).
97. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 266-69.
98. See Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, supra note 88, at
826; Van Alstyne, supra note 88, at 225-26, 233-35.
99. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 2, with Fiss, supra note 46.
REv.
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present the form;

the form is always there to outdistance the mean
ing." 100 The question of whether it is form or meaning,
metalanguage or language-object, that should predominate remains
necessarily unresolvable within the terms of the myth. The myth
cannot resolve this undecidability precisely because the myth is this
undecidability.
To illustrate this point, recall the following scheme outlining the
distinction between meaning and form:

Meaning
(Language-object)
1787

The Framers
The Constitution of 1787
Ratification

Form
{Me
talanguage)
Founding Moment
The Mythic Subject
The Paramount Norm
Consent/Self-Rule

It was previously suggested that such a determinate rendition was in
some sense wrong. Now we shall see why: The undecidability of
meaning and form in myth allows for a different allocation between
the two. What was previously taken to be the metalanguage thus
could very well become the language-objects of some higher order
metalanguage, and so on. The identification of meaning and form
within the constitutional myth might then be redescribed in the fol
lowing terms:

Meaning
(Language-object)
Founding Moment
The Mythic Subject
The Paramount Norm
Consent/Self-Rule

Form
{Me
talanguage)
Ground
Motivating Source
Ultimate Authority
Justification Principle

The possibility of this redescription instantiates Barthes's observa
tion that in myth, "the form always outdistances the meaning." 101
. Of significance here is that the very form of liberal justification
already instantiates the liberal myth. The metalanguage - denoted
as ground, motivating source, ultimate authority, and legitimation
- is the form in which liberal justification operates. Liberal justifi
cation, in the form of its inquiries, asks political theories to furnish
some sort of normative justification for the political order. The
form of liberal justification itself demands a grounds for the polit
ical order - some action, event, happening, or occurrence. The
100. BARTIIBS, supra note 1, at 123.
101. Id.
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form demands a motivating source
some notion of who or what
creates this political order. It demands the establishment of some
ultimate authority that is at once identifiable and determinable. It
also demands that there be some justification principle some rea
son to believe that the ultimate motivating source is justified in rec
ognizing the ultimate authority.
Liberal justification thus institutes a form that anticipates liberal
meaning. This is the form of normative justification. The very form
of normative justification presupposes that reasoned argument can
be used to persuade sovereign autonomous individuals that some
norms can be justified and that the norms in turn justify their re
spective political practices. It presupposes a scene (the human con
stitution of the state), an action (deliberative argument), agents
(sovereign and autonomous individual subjects), and instrumentali
ties (reason) that are the essential components of the liberal world
view. Hence, in its very formulation of the task to be performed, of
the agents to be addressed, and of the manner of performance, the
question of normative justification already posits and presupposes
into existence an essentially liberal ontology, a liberal psychology,
and a liberal narrative.
To ask the question of normative justification is to already situ
ate oneself within the metalanguage of the liberal myth, within the
circles of liberal justification. It is to apprehend and experience the
world within the mythic narratives and ontologies of liberalism. It
is to predispose thought to reach liberal conclusions.
-

-

CONCLUSION

What remains perhaps most interesting about liberal justifica
tion is that it still evokes significant interest. How is this to be ex
plained? Indeed, absent a proclivity for going around the same
circles, what is it about liberal justification that remains appealing
to so many thinkers? The short answer is that for those who are
within the circles of liberal justification, the enterprise seems
neither circular nor empty. They believe. Until one day, they
don't.

